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Historiography Final Paper

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Introduction

This paper argues that the battle of Marathon had proved that the Greeks could stand up against the Persian Empire and this idea would continue throughout the rest of the war. The Greeks beat the Persians and attacked Persian-occupied land post-battles on mainland Greece. They accomplished this through three factors; the Greeks were outnumbered but not outmatched, the unity in Greece vs. the fragmentation in the Persian Empire, and superior battle tactics exhibited by the Greeks which outmatched the tactics used by the Persians.

Historiography

The writing of stories and history is where contemporary historians get the information of the memorable events we know today. Historiography plays a crucial role in the understanding of whether the primary sources, with the ancient writers in particular, had actually happened and if the writer is reliable with what they write. Contemporary historians, like Michael Grant, David Pipes, and Ronald E. Osborn seek to answer these two questions by using other historians as reference and to understand what methods Herodotus used when writing his histories.

In his book *The Ancient Historians*, Grant begins his chapter on Herodotus. Grant explains why the structure of the Herodotus' writings are the way they are and the background as to why the books are organized the way we have them today. In his book, Grant suggests, "One reason for the episodic, apparently disjointed structure of the Histories is that they were written to be read aloud... In any case silent reading, if not totally unknown, was still infrequent".¹ This suggests that the way Herodotus structured his work was for the intent of it becoming an oral tradition and story. The last line of the quote makes sense of how the ancient Greeks told their stories and were not consistent silent readers. This point made by Grant is also supported by

¹ Michael Grant, *The Ancient Historians*. (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1994), 29.

Pipes where he agrees with Grant on the ideology of writing at the time of the ancient Greeks. In his journal article, Pipes suggests, “The author of the *Histories* wanted to do more than retell the events of the past, he wants to prove a point and make sure the people of the future remembered and learned from the events of the past. He did not want to relate his story. He wanted to relate history”.² This also suggests that the writing style of Herodotus is due to the fact that he intended for the stories to be told after he was finished with it.

Another theme that Grant approaches in a chapter regarding the background and beliefs of Herodotus are the factors that influenced Herodotus and his work. Dedicating a chapter to this topic, Grant clearly sees a significance with this factor in Herodotus’ work. Pipes also has a section of his journal based on ‘To Tell a Tale’ in which he also explores the factors that influenced Herodotus’ work. In his journal, Pipes suggests, “Every historian, even the first, consciously and unconsciously shapes his narrative and judgements to convey a perception of his subject in a persuasive manner. Herodotus has an agenda that he tries to bring forth in his narrative”.³ This suggests that Herodotus had both conscious and unconscious influences that shaped his work and methods. Vasiliki Zali is another contemporary historian who mentions how the *Iliad* influences Herodotus’ work. In Zali’s journal article, he says, “A technique Herodotus inherited from Homer and is particularly fond of.”⁴ Factors that would have affected the work and methods would include his home city-state of Halicarnassus, which was on the west coast of Asia Minor to influence what he knew about the Greeks and Persians, and the prior works of Homer to use as example for his writing style in the *Histories*. Grant notices this influence of

² David Pipes, “Herodotus: Father of History, Father of Lies.” *Study of Herodotus, no. 1* (1998-1999). *Loyola University Loyola History Journal*. Accessed March 19, 2017.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Zali, Vasiliki. "Themistocles' Exhortation before Salamis: On Herodotus 8.83." *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies* 53, no. 3 (July 2013): 461-485. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 26, 2017. The technique he mentions is a simplification of the narrative that increases the suspense for the reader and seen used in Herodotus’ work.

Homer on Herodotus in his writing style as mentioned earlier, to write a story for it told out loud rather than silent reading. In his book, Grant suggests, “The speeches quoted in the *Histories* of Herodotus are another profoundly Homeric feature”.⁵ This means that the use of the quotes seen in the *Histories* had an influence from the Homeric style of quoting. These two factors, as suggested by Grant and Pipes, helped shaped the work and methods as seen in the *Histories*.

Another factor that would have influenced Herodotus’ writings was the idea that “History is the idea of human incomprehension and helplessness in the face of the divine will or fate.”⁶ As suggested by Osborn in his journal article. He continues with this point by adding that because of this idea, human hopes for freedom are illusionary, fate is an inescapable force, and that there were powerful forces that determined the outcome of events.⁷ This idea of fate being inescapable and that powerful forces determined outcome of events was relevant and common across Greek culture.

Background

The events leading up to the Greco-Persian Wars are important in understanding why the wars took place. In Thomas R. Martin’s book *Ancient Greece*, he looks at the background of the Greco-Persian wars, starting with the Ionian Revolts in 499 BC. There is a chronology of the whole Greco-Persian war Martin depicts in his book that shows the major events and battles that took place during this time in history.⁸ It began with the Persian intent to expand their empire but they had intention to invade mainland Greece. There would have to be a driving force for the Persians to invade mainland Greece and that is exactly what happened with the revolts of the

⁵ Michael Grant, *The Ancient Historians*. (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1994), 41.

⁶ Ronald E. Osborn, "The Overdetermined Universe." *Modern Age* 57, no. 1 (Winter 2015 2015): 37-47. *Academic Search Premier*, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 26, 2017.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Thomas R. Martin, *Ancient Greece*. (Yale: Nota Bene, 1996), 96.

Ionians found in Asia Minor. In particular, it was the Ionian Revolt that started the Persian intent to take revenge and invade mainland Greece. The idea of a revolt began with the Ionian city-states when the Greeks under Persian control could not handle the tyranny and the Athenians presented a chance to remove their tyrant oppressors. In book five of Herodotus' *Histories*, he writes, "What they [Ionians] did and suffered worthy of note from the time when they gained their freedom until the revolt of Ionia from King Darius, and the coming of Aristagoras of Athens with a request that the Athenians would lend the Ionians aid."⁹ From this, it can be seen that Herodotus gives an account which suggests that the Athenians had a part to play in the Ionian Revolt. This would ultimately lead to the events seen in the first Greco-Persian war, beginning with the battle of Marathon.

The threat of invasion from the Persians had become reality after the Ionian Revolts. After these revolts were settled, King Darius vowed to seek revenge against the Athenians for helping the Ionians revolt against Persian rule. The Persians would then gather a force and begin their first invasion of mainland Greece. This would be known as the first Greco-Persian War and Marathon would be the first of many. The Athenians became aware of the Persian intent after they were focused on stopping the revolts from the Greeks under the Persian control in Asia Minor. An envoy was sent to the mainland Greek city-states asking for tribute and Athens was one of these. In book six of Herodotus' *Histories*, he writes, "He [Darius] sent out heralds in diverse directions round about Greece, with orders to demand everywhere earth and water for the king. At the same time, he sent other heralds to the various seaport towns which paid him tribute, and required them to provide a number of ships of war and horse-transport".¹⁰ This shows that

⁹ Herodotus, *Histories*, Trans. by George Rawlinson (C. 440 BC). *The Internet Classics Archive*. Accessed February 27, 2017.

¹⁰ Ibid.

the demands were set for the Greek city-states to meet. Those who would pay the offering could join the Persians, while those who did not pay the offering would declare themselves enemies to the Persians.

Outnumbered but not Outmatched

The Persians were set on invading Greece and making it a part of their empire at this point. Now the question was how they were to send their soldiers over to Greece in an effective manner. One method of approach was to use the Aegean Sea, which was located in between Asia Minor and Greece, to transport the Persian army. If the Aegean was in control of the Persian Empire, this could be a viable method. This is something that Bowra suggests where he says, “Though Greece is not easy to invade by land, it presents many promising openings to anyone who has control of the sea.”¹¹ However, Meiggs suggests that there was a different approach in mind initially where he says, “The first plan was to advance along the north coast of the Aegean and move south through Thessaly, but a severe storm wrecked Mardonius’ fleet off the Athos promontory and the expedition was abandoned”.¹² Following this failed attempt in 492 BC, the seaborne invasion would be considered and Meiggs continues by saying, “Instead, it was decided, two years later in 490, to sail across the Aegean. The force was entirely sea-borne and cannot have been very large, possibly some 20,000 fighting men. Persian confidence was high and with them on the expedition was Hippias”.¹³ Crossing the Aegean was the method of approach used by the Persians and resulted in Persian landing in the Bay of Marathon. Soon the first battle of the Greco-Persian War would take place.

¹¹ C.M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience*. (NY: The New American Library, 1957), 19.

¹² Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), 30.

¹³ *Ibid.* Hippias was an Athenian tyrant until exiled with Spartan aid. Hippias fled to Persia and joined their ranks so he could use the Persians in order to return to Athens and become its ruler once more.

During the time the Persians were making their way, the Athenians were trying to organize the defense of Greece. The Athenians would go around the rest of Greece and gather as many Greek city-states they could for the battle coming to Marathon. This something that would not have been difficult as two historians would agree that the Greek identity and unity was established by this time. Bowra suggests, “Because all members of a city-state lived in close proximity within a more or less enclosed space, they had a strong sense of unity and kinship.”¹⁴ Haywood also suggests, “Despite their bitter rivalries, the Greeks had developed a strong common identity by the 6th century.”¹⁵ Because strong sense of identity and unity, there would be many Greek city-states siding with Athens in the Battle of Marathon to come.

With both forces ready for the war ahead, the Battle of Marathon would soon start the Greco-Persian War. The Persians had crossed the Aegean Sea and landed at the Bay of Marathon. This is where they also established camp and they would remain here a while since both Persian and Greek forces were hesitant in engaging. The Greeks were hesitant because they did not know the exact number the Persians had brought to Greece and were not supported by Spartan troops. The Persians were hesitant because they were unfamiliar with the surrounding landscape, with the exception of the few Greeks that joined the Persians. However, it would be the Greeks who were to make the first initiative under the command of Miltiades, the Greek who commanded the Greek forces at the Battle of Marathon. Plutarch tells us how even with the many city-states in the Greek army, it would be Miltiades who would command the forces. In the life of Aristides, Plutarch suggests, “So appeasing their rivalry, and bringing them to acquiesce in one and the best advice, he [Aristides] confirmed Miltiades in the strength of an undivided and

¹⁴ C.M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience*. (NY: The New American Library, 1957), 22

¹⁵ John Haywood, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations*, (London: The Penguin, 2005), 102.

unmolested authority.”¹⁶ Miltiades was the one to suggest the initiation of battle from the Greeks on the unsettled Persians and this would be a decisive call for the battle ahead.

This was an interesting call from Miltiades, but respected by the other commanding members of the Greek forces. The only other reason the Greeks would want to wait would be because the Spartans had not joined with the Greek forces at Marathon. Paul Cartledge, in his book writes this in his book where he says, “The Spartan army did not actually manage to join up with the Athenians on time before that famous battle [Marathon] – allegedly because a prior religious duty prevented the Spartans setting off Sparta in time.”¹⁷ Regardless of this fact, the Battle of Marathon begun with what the Greeks had against the outnumbering Persians.

The Battle of Marathon would see around 10,000 Greek forces, mainly composed of Athenians and Plataeans, fighting against around 20,000 Persian forces, as suggested by Meiggs.¹⁸ With the odds in favor of the Persians, two Persians for every one Greek, the Greeks had to outmatch the enemy. A combination of the tactics used by the Greek commanders and unity that brought the Greeks together contributed to their victory in Marathon. The tactics of the Greeks were to utilize the double-envelopment and geography as best they could, since they were the ones familiar with the Greek landscape. This would favor the Greeks since they could maneuver their armies in positions that gave an advantage and surround them causing massive casualties. The unity would come to the motivation given to the Greeks by the commanders present, and this is something Grant comments on in his book where he says, “They had compelled the Greeks, for once, to work together, almost as a single group.”¹⁹ The tactically

¹⁶ Plutarch, *Life of Aristides*, Trans. by John Dryden (C. 75 AD). *The Internet Classics Archive*. Accessed February 27, 2017.

¹⁷ Paul Cartledge, *Ancient Greece*. (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 82.

¹⁸ Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), 30.

¹⁹ Michael Grant, *The Ancient Historians*. (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1994), 25. The commanding officers of the Greek army.

smart and united Greeks would win the battle against the Persians, regardless of the missing Spartan forces to join the battle. The Persians suffered a humiliating defeat and retreated back to their empire, not returning for another ten years until Darius would be succeeded by Xerxes.

Before the Persians returned, a larger army had to be assembled before they could defeat the Greeks. Revolts, such as the Egyptian revolt in 486 BC, would slow down this process where efforts would be refocused to ending internal conflict. This was also the time Darius died and Xerxes would succeed his father and continue the conquering of Greece. Xerxes would approach this differently than his father did by preparing a force, supplies, and planning that took the second Persian invasion beginning in 480 BC. The Greeks knew that one battle was not going to deter the Persians from returning and they also prepared for a second Persian invasion. Plutarch, in his writings of Themistocles, suggests that Themistocles was one of these Greeks who believed that the Battle of Marathon was not the end of the Persian threat, rather it was the beginning of more conflicts.²⁰ A major figure that would arise from this intermission period would be Themistocles, an Athenian commander who would succeed the role Miltiades occupied in the Battle of Marathon. He was too young to be a part of the Battle of Marathon, but came of age in time for the second Persian invasion. Themistocles is well remembered because of his accomplishments in the second Persian invasion of the Greco-Persian War. Plutarch, when writing about why Themistocles was as good as he was, continues with, “Themistocles was so transported with the thoughts of glory and so inflamed with the passion for great actions, that, though he was still young when the battle of Marathon was fought against the Persians, upon the skillful conduct of the general, Miltiades.”²¹ This motivation to achieve greatness, like Miltiades

²⁰ Plutarch, *Life of Themistocles*, Trans. by John Dryden (C. 75 AD). *The Internet Classics Archive*, Accessed February 27, 2017.

²¹ Ibid.

did in the Battle of Marathon, was the reason for Themistocles' accomplishments in the Greco-Persian War.

Greek unity vs. Persian fragmentation

Greek unity was a factor that played a major role in the successful victory at the Battle of Marathon and the other battles after in the Greco-Persian War. There are many factors that played a part to this Greek unity. One of these, mentioned previously, is because the Greeks had already established identity as a people by the 6th century.²² The reason for this identity, and another reason as to why the Greek unity was as strong as it was at the Battle of Marathon is given to us from Bowra. In his book, Bowra suggests, "Because all members of a city-state lived in close proximity within a more or less enclosed space, they had a strong sense of unity and kinship."²³ This suggests that since the geography of Greece allowed for all the diverse city-states to remain in constant contact with one another, they had the means to develop this strong sense of unity seen at the Battle of Marathon. The Greek unity seen in this battle would carry out through the rest of the Greco-Persian War, giving the Greeks an advantage when fighting against the Persians.

The Greek unity can be attributed to the fact that they were protecting their homes and land from foreign invaders. The major city-states, Sparta and Athens, showed this characteristic as to the extent both went to protect Greece when they could. An example to show this unity and desire to protect their land is with the Spartans in the Battle of Thermopylae. Geographically, Sparta is located in the Southern Peninsula of Greece while Thermopylae is the Northern Peninsula.²⁴ Since it is known that the Spartans were the primary defenders of Thermopylae,

²² John Haywood, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations*, (London: The Penguin, 2005), 102.

²³ C.M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience*. (NY: The New American Library, 1957), 22

²⁴ John Haywood, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations*, (London: The Penguin, 2005). 103. A map showing the Greek city-states and extent what Spartan territory was considered during the time before the war.

along with other minor Greek city-states, the desire to defend Greek land is evident further adding to the Greek unity.

However, the one city-state with some exception to this unity, Sparta. Although there are cases where the Spartans also show their unity with the other city-states, for example with the Battle of Thermopylae, the Battle of Marathon showed how they valued their own customs and traditions over the safety of the rest of Greece. The Spartans were absent for the Battle of Marathon, as mentioned previously, because of a religious ceremony that did not allow the Spartans to leave their country until the battle was already won by the other Greek forces.²⁵ Another major factor that would play into why Sparta was an exception is because of their societal structure, an oligarchy that heavily outnumbered and relied on the labors of slaves to supply the rest of the society with resources. This is something Cartledge examples in his book where he suggests, “The price for the Spartans of survival on the basis of exploiting Helot labour power was to have to turn their city into a kind of military barracks.”²⁶ This societal structure allowed for the Spartans to have a military-like state since the warriors could focus on their skills in combat rather than having to worry about how they were going to resources for themselves and/or others. This would also allow the Spartans to control the strongest army in all of Greece, making them a valuable asset in the war when they partook in battles.

On the other hand, the Persian Empire had never shown the same unity seen in the Greeks. Although the motivation was based on revenge, trying to punish the Athenians for interfering with internal affairs, and expansion of the empire, this was not enough to unify the Persians to the extent of the Greek unification. The Persian Empire was a compilation of many different cultures that consisted mostly of peoples from the middle-east. With the case of the

²⁵ Paul Cartledge, *Ancient Greece*. (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 82.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

Persian commander Mardonius, he and his men were separated from the main force of Persians after retreating back to their Empire. There is no evidence to show that the Persians that fled had any intent on returning to Greece to recover the Persian forces that remained. Diodorus Siculus writes how this was the case when the Persians lost control of the seas and fear arose from this fact.²⁷ Grant writes about the fate of Mardonius when referring to Herodotus when he says, “The ninth book describes how its [Persia’s] commander Mardonius was defeated and killed at Plataea by Peloponnesians and Athenians under the Spartan regent Pausanias.”²⁸ Instead of showing unity within the Persian Empire, the defeat of Mardonius and his forces shows the fragmentation.

Greek battle tactics vs. Persian battle tactics

Battle tactics were another major factor in the victory of the Battle of Marathon and the following battles in the Greco-Persian War. This is another area in which the Greeks had been superior in comparison to the Persians. One examples of these battle tactics were the fighting style used by the Greek soldiers known as the phalanx. The Spartans were the Greeks who had mastered this art of war, but other Greek city-states also had the capability of fighting in this style. This is something Haywood discusses in his book where he suggests, “The development in the 7th century of the phalanx, a new way of fighting involving large numbers of infantry in discipline formations.”²⁹ The training and use of this fighting style, which would also give the soldiers the name of phalanx as well, would prove to be influential in the victory for the Greeks in the Battle of Marathon and the other battles in the Greco-Persian War.

²⁷ Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica*, Trans. by Charles Henry Oldfather (C. 60 BC). *Lacus Curtius*, Accessed February 27, 2017.

²⁸ Michael Grant, *The Ancient Historians*. (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1994), 25.

²⁹ John Haywood, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations*, (London: The Penguin, 2005), 102. Phalanx’s were heavily armed soldiers that carried a spear, pike, or sarissa as the primary weapon with a large round shield that would overlap with another phalanx creating a shield wall. The phalanx would also carry a short sword as a secondary weapon in case of it being needed.

The double-envelopment was a common strategy seen used by the Greeks in many of the battles in the Greco-Persian War. This strategy would accompany the phalanx fighting style to cause massive casualties against the Persian army when they met in battles with a geography that allowed for the Greeks to envelop the Persians from both sides. The Spartans were hardened and mighty soldiers that paired the double-envelopment with the phalanx and decimate enemy numbers while having minimal casualties themselves. Diodorus Siculus writes of how the Spartans used these tactics at the Battle of Marathon when he writes, “For since the men stood shoulder to shoulder in the fighting and the blows were struck in close combat, and the lines were densely packed.”³⁰ The double-envelopment was also used in sea battles by the Greeks, with the Battle of Salamis being the example. With the Athenians in command, the tactic used by the Greeks during this battle was to lure the Persians into the bay of Salamis to reduce the Persian numbers fought, and use the faster and agile Greek ships to outmaneuver the Persians.³¹ These two battles show how the tactics used by the Greeks were superior to those of the Persians through the use of the double-envelopment.

Persian battle tactics were different in comparison with the Greeks for reasons based on the army structure and mentality of the attacker and defender. One of the Persian tactics was to outnumber the Greeks due to the sheer number of Persians forces available for the Greco-Persian war. This was a fact that the Persians had more people under its compared since it controlled such a vast empire at the time of the war compared to the Greeks. A map of the Persian Empire

³⁰ Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica*, Trans. by Charles Henry Oldfather (C. 60 BC). *Lacus Curtius*, Accessed February 27, 2017. Initially, the Battle of Marathon showed that the tactics used by the Greeks could hold Thermopylae by drawing in the Persians into small spaces where the Persian numbers did not matter. It wasn't until the Greeks were betrayed by Ephialtes when a few hundred Spartans remained behind to let the other Greek forces escape and suffer the defeat at Thermopylae.

³¹ Herodotus, *Histories*, Trans. by George Rawlinson (C. 440 BC). *The Internet Classics Archive*. Accessed February 27, 2017.

can be seen before the war in Haywood's book.³² A primary source that shows the extend of the army given through a playwright by Aeschylus where he says, "Xerxes led, A thousand ships; their number well I know; Two hundred more, and seven, that swept the seas, With speediest sail: this was their full amount."³³ From this we know that the sheer size of the Persian army was much greater than those of the Greeks. The size of the Persian army would shape their tactics to overwhelm the enemy because of greater numbers.

The Persian fighting style was completely different to that of the Greeks. The Persians had a different soldier composition than that of the Greeks. While the Greeks had heavily armed foot soldiers, the Persians relied on cavalry and archers for the soldier composition. This is something Herodotus suggests in his writings where the Persians had ships just for their horses, equipment to go with them, and other supplies to go with them.³⁴ Because the soldier composition is different, the tactics would also be different. However, this did no favor the Persians since the majority of the Greek soldier composition included heavily armed soldiers with spears, something that countered the attempts of cavalry which had previously helped the Persians conquer the vast majority of its empire before the war.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Greco-Persian War saw an outcome that was not expected with the Greeks victorious over the Persians. The Greeks managed to accomplish this feat through three factors, they were outnumbered but not outmatched. The preparation that went into the first war was deemed enough by the Persian King Darius to defeat the Greeks, deploying around 20,000

³² Ibid., 51.

³³ Aeschylus, *The Persians*, Trans. by Robert Potter (C. 472 BC). *The Internet Classics Archive*. Accessed February 27, 2017.

³⁴ Herodotus, *Histories*, Trans. by George Rawlinson (C. 440 BC). *The Internet Classics Archive*. Accessed February 27, 2017.

Persians soldiers. The Persians would land in the Bay of Marathon and begin their preparations for the battle ahead. The Greeks were also preparing for the battle by establishing leading commanders, and assembling the rest of the Greek city-states through the Greek identity. Miltiades would command the Greeks in the Battle of Marathon and see the Greeks victorious through the use of the unity in Greece and superior battle tactics. After the failure at Marathon, the Persians would have to reevaluate the approach when they came back in 480 BC. This time the Persians brought a larger force, better planning, supplies, and a new leader under Xerxes who succeeded Darius. The second factor is the Greek unity compared to the Persian fragmentation that would make a difference in the war. The Greeks all lived in a close proximity and had that sense of unity and kinship, something that benefitted them when it came to fighting the invaders from their home and country. With Sparta being a city-state that was heavily relied on, but not being able to partake in some battles, like Marathon, this could have impacted the outcome of the war. However, when the Spartans did partake in battles, they showed the same unity and desire to defend their home and country from the invading Persians. On the other hand, the Persians showed a lack of unity and were fragmented since the empire composed of many diverse cultures in the Middle-East. The third factor is the superior Greek tactics in comparison with the Persian tactics. The Greeks had mastered the fighting style of the phalanx, a tactic that countered the Persians when paired with the double-envelopment. The combination of this tactic and fighting style allowed for the Greeks to see many victories when they were outnumbered by the Persians. Finally, the historiography on the writings of Herodotus is important in whether what he says can be reliable when writing on the Greco-Persian War. Contemporary historians, like Grant, Osborn, Pipes, and Zali, all try to understand how different factors shaped Herodotus and his writing style. Consciously and unconsciously, these the way the *Histories* was written suggests

that it was episodic and meant to be spoken. This influence comes from Homer and shapes the way Herodotus intended for his work to be perceived after its completion. Another influence would have been the Greek culture at the time, believers of fate and of powerful beings controlling the fate of humans. All these factors contributed to Herodotus' writings and it can help us when it comes to answering the question whether Herodotus can be seen as reliable or not.

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